DIAGNOSING NORMS

We often find ourselves wondering how social practices that
cause societal damage, violate human rights, or are plainly inefficient can survive. Think of how corruption holds back economic development, erodes public confidence in government,
and undermines the rule of law and fair competition, or how
child marriage forces girls out of education and into a life of
increased risk of violence, abuse, ill health, or even early death.
What motivates such behaviors, and why do they persist, even
in the face of laws that prohibit them? Are these practices supported by cultural norms? How do economic and cultural
structures interact? Which of these questions is most important
to address? Understanding the nature of collective behaviors
and why people engage in them is critical for the design of appropriate interventions aimed at social change. There are many
collective behaviors that are maladaptive, harmful, or violate
what we take to be basic human rights. Addressing these behaviors requires disentangling the personal, social, economic, and
cultural factors that support them and assessing their relative
weights in sustaining these practices.
Collective behaviors, that is, behavioral patterns shared by
a group of individuals, may be studied in a variety of ways. For
example, we may explore the functions they perform in a society or group and investigate the environments within which
they emerge or disappear. Knowing the functions a practice
performs, however, does not tell us if those involved in it are
aware of them, or if they act in certain ways because of them.
We should not make the mistake of conflating the observer's
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and the actor's points of view. We may think that a social norm
maximizes the welfare of its followers, but this may hardly
be the reason why they conform to it. Most of the time, participants are not aware of the social functions that a practice
serves. Alternatively, we may focus on the reasons why people
engage in such behaviors by investigating the incentives and
constraints that they face when undertaking an established behavior or adopting a new one. These two approaches are fully
compatible, and the importance of stressing one or the other
depends upon our intellectual and practical goals. Especially
when wanting to change or promote a particular collective
behavior, we must understand its nature and the reasons why
people take part in it.
In this chapter, I will distinguish between collective behaviors that are completely independent, as when they are purely
determined by economic or natural reasons, and interdependent, as when other people's actions and opinions matter to
one's choice. 1 I want to differentiate actions that are undertaken
because we care about what other people do or think from actions that we have reason to carry out without regard for other
people's behavior or beliefs. These distinctions are important
because in order to implement policies to encourage or discourage certain collective behaviors or practices, we need to
understand their nature, or the reasons why people engage in
them. In what follows, I shall offer a clear and simple way to
distinguish between independent and interdependent behaviors and among different types of interdependent behaviors.
Habits, social customs, and moral injunctions are independent, in the sense that they involve undertaking certain
actions regardless of what others do or expect us to do. For
1.

When I say "independence," I do not refer to outcome-independence: in
a purely competitive market, each agent acts independently, but the final
outcome is the product of a myriad of individual choices. The market
outcome depends on the actions of all the market participants, but this
is not the dependence I am interested in.
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example, we wear warm clothes in winter and use umbrellas
when it rains, independently of what our friends or neighbors
do, and we may obey kashrut dietary laws whether or not
other Jews respect them. Conventions such as signaling systems, fads, fashions, and social norms such as reciprocity rules
are all interdependent behaviors, and social norms are the
foremost example of interdependence. However, as I will make
clear later on, not all collective behaviors are interdependent,
and not all interdependent behaviors are social norms.
This chapter draws on Bicchieri 2006, ch. 1, although some
of the details provided here are different from those in the
book. Here my aim is to offer simple tools that help to quickly
decide whether the collective behavior we care about is a norm
or more simply a shared custom, and if it is a norm, what sort
of norm it is. Without this knowledge, promoting social change
would be difficult, as we would be at a loss about where and
how to intervene. The same practice could be a custom, a convention, or a social norm in different populations. Being able to
determine why it is followed will help us suggest the most appropriate intervention. In what follows I shall rely on concepts
such as expectations and preferences, all of which are relatively
easy to measure and handle, especially in light of wanting to
conduct experiments or field surveys. How we come to the conclusion that a collective behavior is a social norm is the subject
of the next chapter, where I will discuss ways to measure norms
that are based on the concepts introduced here.
Here I shall offer a few static definitions. They are static
because in real life, the social constructs I talk about may
morph into each other and often do. A custom may become a
social norm in time, and a social norm may revert to a custom
(think of the use of white wedding dresses). This dynamic process merits investigation, but for the moment I will be treating
social constructs as separate, fixed entities. This classification
will help us diagnose the nature of a practice or action pattern,
in turn suggesting the best way to encourage or discourage it.
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How individuals relate to certain patterns of behavior determines the pattern's nature. There are highways where most
people drive over the speed limit, precincts with low voter
turnout, pockets of resistance to polio vaccination, littered
environments, countries where bribing is endemic, and cultures where girls are married at a very young age. What drives
these behaviors? Are choices independent or interdependent?
Understanding the motives behind these collective behaviors
is critical to changing them.
Diagnosing collective patterns of behavior as interdependent, and being very specific about the nature of this interdependence, will help us decide what sort of intervention offers
the best chance of success. Think of widespread HIV awareness
campaigns in African countries, where condoms are freely distributed to the population, yet the number of newly infected
people is increasing. Distributing condoms and relying on
information campaigns about the risks of unprotected sex is
insufficient if men share a common view of masculinity that
glorifies promiscuity and if they refrain from using condoms
at home for fear of giving away the existence of "other women."
When behaviors are interdependent, we have to consider entire
communities, as individuals' choices depend on what people
who are important to them do, and possibly also on what they
judge appropriate or inappropriate.
Think of child marriage, an interdependent practice that
many governments and international organizations are actively
trying to eliminate. According to the International Center for
Research on Women (ICRW), 100 million girls will be married
before the age of eighteen in the coming decade. Most live in
sub-Saharan Africa and the Asian Subcontinent. A variety of
potential causes have been explored. The parents of child brides
are often poor and use marriage as a way to provide for their
daughter's future, especially in areas where there are few economic opportunities for women. Some families use marriage
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to build and strengthen alliances, to seal property deals, settle
disputes, or pay off debts. In some cultures, child marriage is
encouraged to increase the number of pregnancies and ensure
enough children survive into adulthood to work on family
land and support elderly relatives. In South Asia, some families marry off all their daughters at the same time to reduce
the cost of the wedding ceremony. Chastity and family honor
are another major reason, as many parents want to make sure
their daughters do not have a child out-of-wedlock (Bicchieri,
Lindemans, and Jiang 2014).
There are a variety of cultural reasons for child marriage,
but in most cases, the social pressure to marry very young girls
is intense. In India's southern state of Tamil Nadu, some communities have a strong social stigma against girls being married after puberty. Often African families report fearing that
if girls receive an education, they will be less willing to fulfill
their traditional roles as wife and mother, and so it will be difficult for them to find a husband, with negative consequences for
the family. Trying to induce a change in behavior critically depends upon understanding the reasons behind the choices. In
many cases such choices are driven by a combination of shared
factual beliefs (about the value of education and how best to
protect a girl), social expectations (what other families do and
think is appropriate), and normative (or religious) constraints
(what good parents should do).
Let us imagine two separate groups who marry their
daughters as soon as they reach puberty. These practices
look identical, but th~ beliefs supporting them are very different, and these differences have major consequences for
policies aimed at curbing the practice. Members of the first
group believe their religion calls for early marriage, and deviating from a religious injunction will bring disgrace to
the entire family. They may entertain a host of other beliefs
about marriage: they may believe that a young bride is more
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valuable, more fertile, more likely to obey her in-laws, will
be protected from sexual violence or out-of-wedlock births
that would dishonor the family, and so on. The members of
the second group have similar beliefs, but lack the religious
principle that fosters the first group's practice. In both cases,
the social pressure to marry young girls will be intense, but
within the first group the religious beliefs will represent a
major stumbling block to changing marriage practices. We
may work hard to change some factual beliefs in both groups,
and possibly succeed. We may build safe schools for girls,
and help appease fears of violence and dishonor, pay parents
for attendance and subsequently provide jobs to the girls,
but the unconditional allegiance to a religious creed will be
much harder to overcome. I will explore the factors that differentiate these two groups-which would inform the design
of policies aiming at changing these practices-in a later section of this chapter.

CONDITIONAL PREFERENCES
In what follows I offer a simple way to discriminate between
behavioral patterns shared by a group. The concepts I use to
this effect are those of preference and expectation. Preferences
are dispositions to act in a particular way in a specific situation. When I say that I prefer to drive to school instead of
taking the train, I mean that, if given the choice, I would take
the car. Often people make the mistake of equating preference
with "liking better." If I choose a vanilla ice cream instead of a
chocolate one, you may infer that I like vanilla better. What you
may not know is that I adore chocolate but am allergic to it. So
despite liking chocolate more, I prefer (choose) vanilla instead.
What preference really means is that, in a choice situation, if
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I choose A over B it must be the case that, all things considered,
I prefer A. Preference and choice are thus strictly connected.
Preferences may be strictly individual (like the ice cream
example), or they may be social. For example, I may not eat ice
cream when I am out with friends since they have passionate
views about dieting. Social preferences may take into account
the behavior, beliefs, and outcomes of other people that, presumably, matter to the decision maker. Some such preferences
are consequentialist, in that the decision maker only cares
about the final outcome, not how it was obtained, nor whether
the other parties had expectations about his or her choice. Say
you have a preference for fair divisions. Then, if you have to
choose how to allocate some good, you will take into account.
how much of it goes to other claimants, and you may feel guilty
if you take too much for yourself. Alternatively, you may be
envious and resent an allocation that grants a larger share to
others, or you might even be spiteful and want to maximize the
difference between what you and others receive. In all of these
cases, you care about what you get and what others get, too.
You make social comparisons, but you may not be concerned
about what the other parties do or believe, or how the outcome
came about. Your only concern is how the final outcome is allocated. So someone who decides to split a sum of money into
equal parts may be moved by an independent desire to be fair,
or instead she may respond to what she believes is expected of
her. In both cases we say that she has a social preference, though
she might be influenced either by a social comparison or by
social expectations.
Social preferences that are based on social comparisons
can be unconditional, in that one's choice is not influenced by
knowing how others act in similar situations or what they approve/disapprove of. If instead one chooses an action based on
expectations about what others do or believe should be done,
then such preferences are conditional on those actions and
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beliefs. For example, a mother may choose to overtly beat her
child because all the other parents around her do so, and she
fears being looked down upon or reprimanded if she does
not hit him hard. In fact, she might not like to punish so
harshly, but what would the neighbors think of her? In this
case, we say that her "preference" for corporal punishment is
conditional upon her social expectations. She chooses to hit
because she sees other parents hitting, and she believes that
she would suffer negative consequences if she behaved differently and her behavior could be detected. Saying that she has
a social preference for beating her disobedient child does not
tell us whether her preference is unconditional, that is, she
is genuinely convinced about the merits of corporal punishment, or is conditional, in that she is influenced by what her
neighbors think and do.
Returning to the case of fair division, you may not care at
all about fairness per se, but you nevertheless divide the good
equally because you are sensitive to what others normally do
and expect you to do. In other words, you have a preference for
sharing conditional on the fact that others share. This is quite
different from being independently motivated to act fairly. The
social preferences I will be talking about are mostly conditional, in the sense that the behaviors of interest often depend
on what other people that matter to the actor think and do.
Interdependent actions, as we shall see, always involve socially
conditional preferences. 2 Table 1.1 describes different kinds of
preferences, using the simple example of preferring or not preferring to eat apples.
Preferences should not be confused with what social psychologists call "attitudes" (Fishbein 1967). An attitude is understood as an evaluative disposition toward some object, person,
2.

From now on, when I talk of conditional preferences, I always mean
"socially" conditional preferences.
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Table 1.1

CLASSIFYING DIFFERENT TYPES OF PREFERENCES
Individual preferences Social preferences
Unconditional

"I want apples."

Conditional

"I want apples if it is
autumn."

"I want more apples
than you."
"I want apples if my
friends want apples."

or behavior. It can be expressed by statements such as "I like/
dislike," "I believe one should/should not," and "I approve/disapprove of." Attitudes thus include personal normative beliefs
that express a person's positive or negative evaluation of particular behaviors. Such personal normative beliefs, in turn, can
be prudential, or they can have a "moral"3 motivation. I may
disapprove of smoking in a prudential sense because I know its
negative health effects. In other words, I believe that smoking is
inadvisable or not in one's best interest. Historically, smoking
by women was strongly disapproved in a moral sense in that
it was seen as a sign of debauchery and lack of womanly virtues. Such a moral personal normative belief implies that one's
ethical convictions motivate disapproval. I shall return to this
point in the next section.
We know from economics that preferences and choices are
positively correlated. What about attitudes and choices? We
might expect that people who positively evaluate a particular
behavior would engage in the behavior to a greater degree than
others might. If a group of people thinks that drinking alcohol
is acceptable, should we not witness a lot of drinking in this
3. Here and elsewhere, I use "moral" in the broad sense of the term, as
referring to certain codes of conduct adopted by an individual, a group
or a society.
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population? Unfortunately, it has been consistently observed
that general attitudes and behavior are weakly correlated, if
they are correlated at all (Wicker 1969).4 Individuals may express positive judgments toward behaviors that they nevertheless do not engage in. Why so? To answer, consider that most of
our choices are not made in a vacuum. We are social animals
embedded in thick networks of relations, and what we do has
consequences, for us and for others. Interdependence, not independence, rules social life. Indeed, a host of studies show that
the main variable affecting behavior is not what one personally likes or thinks he should do, but rather one's belief about
what "society" (i.e., most other people, people who matter to us,
and the like) approves of (see, e.g., Bicchieri and Muldoon 2011;
Fishbein 1967).
A woman might prefer not to breastfeed after giving birth,
even if she has learned about the advantages of feeding colostrum to the baby, or a family might prefer to give their young
daughter in marriage even if they would have liked it better to
send her to school and wait. These choices occur regardless of
the mother or family's attitudes toward these practices. All these
preferences are conditional on expecting people who matter
to us to do the same, approve of such behaviors, and possibly
punish deviations. Having a conditional preference implies that
one may have a reason to avoid early breastfeeding or marry
off one's child, which is different from liking and endorsing
these practices. To uncover the reasons why a collective behavior survives, we have to look beyond attitudes to the beliefs and
conditional preferences of those who engage in it. This is why I
like to use almost exclusively preferences and expectations in

4.

However, when there is a high level of correspondence between an attitude and a behavior, then attitudes can be predictive of behaviors; see
Ajzen and Fishbein 1977.
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my analysis of norms. They are easy to measure, and measuring
them lets us meaningfully classify collective behaviors.

SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS
People who have conditional social preferences care about what
others who matter to them do and/or approve of. They have
expectations that influence their behavior (Bicchieri 2014). A
driver will stop on red and go on green because she has expectations about how other drivers will behave and how they expect
her to behave. A parent who beats a child will have expectations about what other parents in his neighborhood do, and how
they may judge him. These expectations are just beliefs. We have
all sorts of beliefs. We believe that tomorrow it will rain, and
we believe that people drive faster on I-96 than the speed limit
and are hardly monitored. Beliefs can be factual or they can be
normative. Both "I believe that colostrum is dirty and dangerous for the baby" and "I believe that dowry costs increase with
the bride's age" are factual beliefs, beliefs about states of affairs,
though only one is true. As we shall see later on, belief change
is an important part of social change. People need reasons to
change, and realizing that some of their factual beliefs are false
can give them the needed push to consider alternatives. Beliefs
like "women should cover their heads and faces" are instead
normative, in that the "should" expresses an evaluation-it signals approval of veiling women.
Expectations are beliefs about what is going to happen or
what should happen; both presuppose a continuity between
past and present or future. In what follows, I will only refer
to social expectations, that is, the expectations we have about
other people's behaviors and beliefs. Some social expectations
are factual or empirical: they are beliefs about how other people
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are going to act or react in certain situations. We may have observed how people behave, or some trusted source may have
told us that people behave in such and such a way. If we have
reason to believe that they will continue to act as in the past,
we will have formed empirical expectations about their future
behavior. What matters to our analysis is that very often these
empirical expectations influence our decisions. For example, if
every time I go to England I observe people driving on the left
side of the road, and I have no reason to think there has been
a change, I will expect left-side driving the next time around.
Wanting to avoid an accident, I will drive on the left side, too.
Other social expectations are normative, in that they express our belief that other people believe (and will continue to
believe) that certain behaviors are praiseworthy and should be
carried out, while others should be avoided. Normative (social)

expectations are beliefs about other people's personal normative
beliefs (i.e., they are second-order beliefs). "I believe that the
women in my village believe that a good mother should abstain
from nursing her newborn baby" is a normative expectation,
and it may have a powerful influence on behavior. Table 1.2
exemplifies the important differences between different types
of beliefs.

Table 1.2

CLASSIFICATION OF NORMATIVE/NON-NORMATIVE
AND SOCIAL/NON-SOCIAL BELIEFS
Non-social beliefs

Social beliefs

Non-normative
beliefs

Factual beliefs

Empirical expectations

Normative beliefs

Personal normative
beliefs

Normative expectations
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Important distinctions among personal normative beliefs
are often missed in surveys, because questions about attitudes
are often too vague to capture these distinctions. Attitude
questions can include questions about personal normative
beliefs, but no distinction is made between prudential versus
"moral" normative beliefs. It is important to recognize the difference between different types of normativity. For example,
a survey may pose questions like "do you believe that a wife
should refrain from committing adultery?"; all the researcher
attains with such questions are just the nonspecific personal
normative beliefs of the responder. 5 Say two people, A nan and
Dayo, both answer "yes" to the first question. Anan thinks that
adultery always ultimately gets discovered, and the adulterer
would be wise to renounce carnal temptations to avoid punishment, so her answer reflects a prudential "should." Dayo's
answer instead reflects her judgment about adultery as a reprehensible breach of faith and trust in a marriage, regardless
of the social consequences such actions incur. Dayo's "should"
has a different, strongly normative connotation. How would
new information change their minds? Given an environment
in which adultery is tolerated or reliably undetectable, Anan
could easily change her mind, but Dayo would not be swayed
in her conviction about the ills of adultery. I shall discuss the
difficulties involved in belief change in chapter 3.
Personal normative beliefs may or may not coincide with
one's normative expectations. A woman may believe that she
ought to infibulate her daughter, or she may be less sanguine
about infibulation, and in both cases believe that her fellow villagers think she ought to infibulate her child. If she is obeying her group's norm to infibulate the child, regardless of her
5.

I am for the moment assuming that the responder is sincere and a social
desirability bias has been avoided. As we shall see in chapter 2, this assumption is often wrong.
·
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personal normative beliefs, her behavior will be influenced by
her beliefs about what relevant others think she should dothat is, her normative expectations. Notice that normative expectations always express an indirect evaluation: one believes
that other people think one ought to behave in a certain way
(or refrain from behaving in a certain way), where the ought, as
we shall see, is not merely prudent. The man who beats his wife
may believe that his neighbors approve of such behavior, that
they think he should chastise her if she misbehaves. Again, this
expectation presupposes some continuity between what was
approved/disapproved in the past and what is approved/disapproved now and in the future.
But whose actions or approval do we care about? Depending
on the circumstances, different people will matter to our decisions. They may be family members, clan or village members,
religious authorities, co-workers, bystanders, and whoever
in that moment has the power to influence our choice. What
we expect them to do matters; what we think they believe we
ought to do matters. I call the range of people whom we care
about when making particular decisions our reference network
because they may be spread around and not be physically present. The Pakistani man who killed his "dishonored" daughter
in Milan, where he had lived for twenty years, was only concerned with the strict honor code of the relatives and friends
in his Pakistani village. That was his reference network, not
his Italian co-workers or neighbors. In Brazil, favela dwellers
only punish stealing within their group, not stealing outside
their group, so an action that is prohibited within a reference
network may be permissible outside of it. It is important to
keep in mind that a crucial element of any empirical study of
social norms will be the identification of the reference network
against which expectations are set.
For the time being, let us agree that there are two types
of social expectations, empirical and normative, that they
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involve a reference network, and often, alone or in combination, influence our behavior. Let us now see what might be
the relation between preferences, expectations, and patterns
of behavior.

CUSTOMS
Imagine observing a common pattern of behavior: when it
rains, we see that people normally use umbrellas. Do they use
umbrellas because other people do? Are their choices influenced by social expectations? If so, which expectations matter?
Would they use umbrellas irrespective of what others do? These
are questions we should ask if we want to diagnose the nature
of collective behaviors.
Like using umbrellas when it rains, certain action patterns
are created and sustained by the motivations of actors acting
independently. Suppose you live in an environment where
water is scarce and latrines do not exist. All find it useful to
satisfy their bodily needs by defecating in the open. This action
meets their needs and will therefore be repeated. This repetition will create a habit. Since people have similar needs, the
habitual action that meets their needs will become a custom.
The consistency of the pattern is due to the actors' similar motivations and conditions. Each actor acts independently, and the
result is an emergent pattern of behavior that reproduces itself.
Each individual knows that everybody else in her community
acts in a similar way, but this awareness does not serve as a
motive for doing what one does anyway, out of sheer need or
convenience. As we shall see later on, these motives may act as
drags on social change. I thus define a custom as follows:
A custom is a pattern of behavior such that individuals (uncondi tionally) prefer to conform to it because it m eets their needs.
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Clearly, in the case of customs, preferences are unconditional.
Expecting other people to behave in a similar way does not influence one's behavior, since this expectation is not a reason to
persist in or change one's habit. We know that other people use
umbrellas, but so what? Whatever they do, we will keep using
our umbrellas when it rains!
Not all customs are benign, though they may efficiently
serve some basic needs. Open defecation is an example of a
custom that presents a huge sanitation problem in many parts
of the world. It is estimated that 15 percent of the world population practices open defecation, with extremely negative
health consequences, as well as social costs that are less easy
to quantify. 6
Customs can change in several ways. We may discover alternative, better means to satisfy our needs, the external conditions that produce these needs may cease to exist, new preferences may be created, or a combination of such changes may
come about. Sometimes we come to grasp the advantages of
new behaviors, but if there are costs involved, change may be
hard to come by. This difficulty is due to the fact that the proposed alternative often requires collective action. The collective custom is a pattern of independent actions, but changing it introduces interdependencies. For example, abandoning
open defecation requires first a change in factual beliefs about
the health and social costs of this practice. The next step
consists in building latrines, using them, and maintaining
6.

The majority of those practicing open defecation live in rural areas. Open
defecation in rural areas persists in every region of the developing world,
even among those who have otherwise reached high levels of improved
sanitation use. For instance, the proportion of rural dwellers still practicing open defecation is 9 percent in Northern Africa and 17 percent
in Latin America and the Caribbean. Open defecation is highest in
rural areas of Southern Asia, where it is practiced by 55 percent of the
population.
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them operational. This process requires the engagement of the
whole community, which has to allocate tasks and ensure that
the old ways are abandoned; otherwise the health benefits of
having functioning latrines may be lost. Here the individual incentive to continue with the established habit may conflict with
the collective benefit of having better sanitation. People facing
change confront a social dilemma: it is individually tempting
(and most convenient) to stick to the old habit, but everyone
would benefit from a collective shift to latrines. Yet if only some
use latrines, the sanitation benefit is lost: water and land pollution will still occur. In this case, not only would everyone have
to be convinced to change their ways, but the new behavior,
in order to survive, would have to be supported by both the
expectation that others are engaging in it and the expectation
that most people think that the behavior should be followed.
Such expectations played no role in the custom's survival, but
they become critical for its demise.
What matters for the present discussion is that a collective
process of belief change may be necessary to implement a new
pattern of behavior, even when abandoning simple customs,
especially if the new behavior requires the collaboration of everyone to be sustained. Collective belief change may not be sufficient in all those cases in which carrying out the new behavior
involves a social dilemma. In cases of open defecation, building and maintaining latrines requires a collective effort and the
introduction of sanctions to ensure continuous compliance,
since even a few defectors can have a powerfully detrimental
effect on a group's hygiene. Therefore monitoring adherence to
the new behavior becomes all the more critical. Yet the introduction of sanctions, though crucial, is secondary to the initial
process of factual belief change. People must first recognize the
negative consequences of open defecation. How customs can be
changed, and the challenges of sustaining new behaviors, is a
topic I will discuss in the third chapter.
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DESCRIPTIVE NORMS
There are many collective behaviors that may look like customs
but are instead influenced by social expectations. These collective behaviors depend on expectations about what others do or
expect one to do in a similar situation. Such behaviors display
various degrees of interdependence, depending on whether
expectations are normative or empirical, unilateral or multilateral. I use the word descriptive norm to refer to all those interdependent behaviors where preferences are conditional on
empirical expectations alone.
Let me add a note of warning, since my definition is unconventional. The term "descriptive norm" is widely employed
to mean "what is commonly done," what is usual and customary (Schultz et al. 2007). It describes how people typically
act, what they regularly do in particular situations. I find this
definition too vague and of little practical use. The traditional
understanding of a descriptive norm includes, for example, a
custom like open defecation, a fashion like wearing high heels,
or the use of a common signaling system, like traffic lights or
language, for coordination purposes.
While the perceived existence of a custom alone does not
cause people to engage in it, the perceived existence of a fashion or common signaling system can do so. A custom is a consequence of independently motivated actions that happen to
be similar to each other, whereas a common signaling system
causes action via the joint force of expectations and a desire
to coordinate with other users of the system. The existence of
an established fashion causes an action that is consistent with
it via the presence of expectations and the desire to imitate
the trendy. Depending on the context, one might copy those
in proximity, those in similar situations, those with similar
characteristics, or those who are similar in some other relevant
way. One may copy either what one perceives to be the most
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frequent action or the most successful actors. Women buy very
high heels not for the (zero) comfort of the shoe, but instead
because they want to be fashionable, copy trendsetters, and
expect other women in their circle to do the same. Once a fashion is established, it will induce actions in line with it. I thus
define a descriptive norm as follows (Bicchieri 2006):
A descriptive norm is a pattern of behavior such that individuals prefer to conform to it on condition that they believe that
most people in their reference network conform to it (empirical
expectation).

There are two elements here that differentiate a descriptive
norm from a shared custom. In the case of a descriptive norm,
people do not prefer to engage in a particular behavior irrespective of what others do. Instead, their preference for conformity
is conditional upon observing (or believing) how others act. The
"others" in this case must be somehow relevant to the actor. The
reference network may be scattered, and may not necessarily coincide with groups one associates with daily. In the television
series The Sopranos, many of the characters' behaviors were
based on what they (wrongly) believed to be the customary ways
in Italy, only to realize later on that modern Italians had moved
well beyond those patterns. A young woman in Philadelphia
wearing very high heels will probably not care what other
women do in India, or even New Orleans. Her reference network may be the "fashionable" crowd in her town, those who she
is likely to meet and give her a chance to "show off;' or it may be
a celebrity, magazine starlets, or TV series that girls in her reference network follow. 7 In the case of significant media influence,
it is important to recognize that those who watch the television
7.

The TV show Sex and the City was associated with a spike in sales of
Manolo Blahnik shoes.
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program or read the popular magazine know that "everyone is
reading/watching that" where "everyone" presumably refers to
people that matter to one's choice to adopt a fashion. One of the
reasons the media can be so influential in initiating or changing
behavior is precisely the viewer or reader's awareness that many
others in her reference network receive the same message.
In descriptive norms, expectations about what others are
doing play a decisive role in choosing (or avoiding) an action,
as in their absence different actions may be chosen. The main
difference between a custom and a descriptive norm lies in the
reasons why people follow them, since from an observational
viewpoint, the practices may look identical. Understanding this
distinction is crucial if we want to promote behavioral change. To
change a negative custom, we may want to start by trying to convince individuals that a particular action or practice-though it
meets a need-has serious drawbacks, and then propose feasible
alternatives. People normally have factual beliefs about the consequences of their actions, and changing those beliefs is the first
step to changing behavior. With descriptive norms, we have to
engage the norm-following group in a more complex way, as expectations play a crucial role in sustaining the practice. To enact
change, the empirical expectations of most participants have to
change. This proves to be challenging, as change, to succeed, has
to be synchronized. If I wear very high heels because of the drive
to imitate the fashionable and the concurring belief that most
women in my social network now wear them, it is not sufficient
to observe a few women behaving differently (especially if they
are not trendsetters). 8 I must be convinced that very high heels
8. Trendsetters are early adopters, people who start (or follow early on) a
·new trend before most other people. Psychologists still debate whether
there are specific character traits that make people trendsetters, apart
from their social position (some may be in positions of power or privilege). I discuss trendsetters' characteristics in much more detail in
chapter 5.
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are now out of fashion. The same goes for a signaling system.
Since our goal is coordinated communication, we have to be
convinced that everybody we may communicate with is moving
to another system of signals before we change, too. Coordinated
change is obviously critical. How this can be accomplished is the
subject of the last two chapters, where I discuss social change.
What should be clear is that the means employed to change a
collective practice must be tailored to its nature.

Imitation and Coordination
Why people have conditional preferences, why they prefer to
do something if they expect others to do it, and why some behaviors become viral are all questions relevant to understanding social change, especially change that involves abandoning
or creating norms. Economic, legal, and political changes often
instigate or accompany norm change. Yet if norms, descriptive
or otherwise, exist because followers have certain preferences
and expectations, exogenous changes might not be sufficient to
induce meaningful behavioral change. In any event, they will
be successful only if they produce and coordinate a collective
change in expectations.
In his essay "On Sumptuary Laws," Montaigne ([1580]
2003) cleverly observed that sixteenth-century French laws
aiming at restricting superfluous and excessive consumption
among the merchant class often had the opposite effect.
The way by which our laws attempt to regulate idle and vain expenses in meat and clothes, seems to be quite contrary to the end
designed . . . . For to enact that none but princes shall eat turbot,
shall wear velvet or gold lace, and interdict these things to the
people, what is it but to bring them into a greater esteem, and
to set every one more agog to eat and wear them? (Montaigne
[1580] 2003, 300)
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In this case, prohibiting imitation of the aristocratic ways
made them ever more attractive to commoners. If anything,
preferences were reinforced.
In other cases exogenous triggers may work quite well.
When we want to coordinate with others, any change in expectations will lead to a change in (conditional) preferences and
behavior. An external intervention that credibly changes social
expectations will most certainly produce a change in preferences in this setting. On September 3, 1967, traffic in Sweden
switched from driving on the left-hand side of the road to the
right. The change was mandated by the government and went
on smoothly, presumably because nobody wanted to keep driving on the left side of the road when the expectation was that
now everybody would drive on the right-hand side.
Coordination is different from imitation. With imitation,
those I imitate do not expect me to behave like they do and may
not even know they are being imitated, so my expectations are
unilateral. When a girl imitates an actress or the fashionable
group in her school, they do not expect her to act as they do.
What matters is that she expects them to act in a certain way.
And this is true for each and every imitator. With coordination,
expectations are instead multilateral. If you and I want to coordinate on wearing a bandanna of the same color, it matters what
each of us expects the other to do. To succeed, our expectations
have to match. An external intervention can potentially change
social behavior if it works as a coordinating device, changing
multilateral expectations. It is much less apt to succeed with
imitation, unless it mandates a change in the imitated party.
Many descriptive norms do not directly fulfill a coordination function, even if we observe what appears to be coordinated behavior. It is often noticed that portfolio managers tend
to make similar financial choices and offer similar advice to
clients. One reason for this is that nobody is capable of predicting market gyrations, and in case the market tanks it is better
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to be aligned with the herd, so as to diffuse responsibility for a
bad choice and relativize losses. Those managers do not intentionally coordinate, but rather imitate each other. Imitative behavior is widespread in every society. When uncertain, we look
at what others are doing to resolve insecurity about making a
decision. Before buying a refrigerator or a car, or hiring a landscaper, we often go to web sites that list buyers' comments about
products and services. Websites like Angie's List, Yahoo, or
Amazon owe their fortune to social proof, our tendency to imitate others' choices because we grant them superior knowledge
of the product or service (they bought it!).
Imitation, or conformity to others' behavior, has two components: informational and normative (Deutsch and Gerard
1955). In new, uncertain, or ambiguous situations, we often
turn to others to gather information and obtain guidance.
Imitation may be rational if collecting information is very hard
or very costly, if we lack expertise, or instead if the choice is
unimportant, so a wrong decision is not the end of the world.
When many people make similar choices, we tend to take it as
evidence of effective, adaptive behavior. Note that largenumbers are not necessary to induce imitation. People often imitate
the behavior of the successful, guessing that some observable
traits correlate with their accomplishments. "Dress for success"
is a glaring example of this na'ive belief.
We all have a natural desire "to be correct," and often what
is correct is defined by our social reality: I know I am a good
runner when I compare my record to those of other runners.
The case of financial managers is a little different: their herding behavior has the effect of minimizing potential losses. In
situations of great uncertainty, it pays to "follow the herd," for
if circumstances deteriorate, one will not look that bad ("everyone was doing it!").
Besides being correct, people also want to be liked, to
belong, and to "go along with the crowd." We often adopt the
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prevailing group standards and behaviors to gain (or avoid
losing) social appreciation, respect, and acceptance. In the case
of informational influence, there is no social pressure to conform to other people's views and beliefs, nor is one expected
to conform. As I said, expectations are unilateral. With normative influence, there may or may not be group pressure to
conform. That is, one may conform because one wants to gain
acceptance or be liked, but a lack of conformity will not necessarily be reproached by the group.
Let us go back for a moment to our fashion slave. What
motivates her to buy those uncomfortable, high-heel shoes?
Both informational and normative influences are likely at
work. On the one hand, she wants to imitate the fashionable
crowd, as looking at what they wear is giving her valuable information about what is now "in." On the other hand, being
fashionable makes her feel she belongs to a valuable group, and
she will possibly become more popular if she dresses like them.
However, nobody is going to require that she wears high heels,
and nobody will spend time and energy reprimanding her for
not doing so.
A similar case was reported by a participant in the PennUNICEF training course on social norms. The wife of a village
chief independently decided to breastfeed her children from
birth. This was unusual behavior because it was widely believed
that colostrum was dirty and might damage the baby. The fact
that the woman was powerful and that her children seemed
healthy "despite" being breastfed at an early age induced a wave
of imitation. In this case, there was the normative influence of
wanting to imitate and please the powerful in addition to the
informational influence of the confidence that she displayed
when defying old habits.
A different case is one in which employees in a coffee shop
"salt" the tip jar. Here they play on the common tendency of
"doing as others do" and wish clients will be induced to leave a
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tip, like others appear to have done. They hope clients will feel
social pressure to leave a tip. Again, there is no evident reproach
for not doing it, aside from perhaps a slight embarrassment on
the client's part. Fashions and fads, "imitating the successful,"
social proof, and salting the tip jar are all examples of behaviors
that are driven by unilateral expectations.
Now think of coordinating on a signal, a multilateral situation. Signals may be as complex as a language, or as simple
as traffic lights. Here the normative influence may vary from
nil to significant. If I stop using a signal that many others use,
as in the case of a widely spoken language, nobody will possibly care, and I will be the only one to pay a price, for I will
be ignored. But think of stopping (unilaterally) to obey traffic
lights. Running a red light not only endangers my own life, but
also endangers other people's lives as well. To safely use traffic
lights, everyone must expect that all drivers stop at red and go
at green. If people start disregarding the signal, coordination
is lost, and everybody is put at risk. When we call those who
disregard a red light "crazy" or "idiots," we imply that they are
doing something that can damage them too. So, there certainly
is a normative influence here, but is it superseding everything
else? What are the main reasons why people stop at a red light?
Is there a temptation not to? If there were no blame for disregarding traffic signals, would people disregard them? If your
reason to stop is that you expect other drivers to obey traffic
lights and thus drive smoothly and safely, your empirical expectation and the desire to coordinate with other drivers are
what matters most to your choice. Traffic conventions, once established, do not require the force of law or social enforcement
to sustain themselves. It is in everyone's self-interest to follow
the convention, as deviation does not pay.
The coordination motive is very different from imitation,
in that expectations are multilateral and stem from a desire to
harmonize our actions with those of others so that each of our
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individual goals can be achieved. Signaling systems, language
rules, rules of etiquette, and dress codes are all examples of descriptive norms that are driven by multilateral expectations.
A preference for following a descriptive norm may involve
both informational and normative influences, or the wish to
coordinate with others, but this preference remains conditional
on empirical expectations alone. This means that if these expectations were to change, preferences and behavior would change
too. There is a causal relationship between expectations, preferences, and behavior. If we want to claim that descriptive norms
have causal influence, it is not sufficient to look for a correlation
between expectations and behavior as evidence (i.e., to observe
that certain expectations and certain behaviors frequently
occur together). There are many correlations that are causally irrelevant. Wearing warm clothes in winter is a collective
habit motivated by the need to keep the body warm. We do
not choose to wear warm clothes because we expect others to
wear them. 9 Our choice is independent of expectations. If we
were to query Philadelphia residents, we would find out that everyone expects other residents to wear warm clothes in winter.
And we may also observe that the individuals we have queried
wear warm clothes in winter. We do have a correlation between
expectations and choices (they occur together in a consistent
way). But are those expectations causally relevant to the behavior we observe? Or does the observed behavior instead generate
the expectation?
Causal relations involve counterfactual dependence: A and
B both occurred, but if A had not occurred (and B had no other
sufficient cause), B would not have occurred either. For example, if we think that lack of water is the main reason why people
do not build latrines, we must be prepared to say that, if water
9.

That said, the kind of warm clothes we wear may be fashion-based, and
thus influenced by expectations.
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were abundant (contrary to the fact that it is scarce), then latrines would be built and used. 10 I am greatly simplifying here,
but these are the basic ideas. We can be pretty sure that were
we to observe people going around scantily dressed in a harsh
winter, our expectations would change, but our behavior would
not. When I was teaching at Carnegie Mellon University, many
computer students braved the winter snow in T-shirts, shorts,
and flip-flops. Most of us looked at them as alien nerds as we
snuggled in our warm coats.
My view about descriptive norms, as opposed to customs,
is that they have a causal influence on behavior. Expecting
members of our reference network to behave according to the
descriptive norm (i.e., expecting a consistent pattern of behavior), and having preferences conditional on these expectations
induces individuals to conform to that pattern. In this case, we
would observe that expectations and behavior are strongly correlated, but to know why we must know what mechanism produces the correlation. To find out, we need to experimentally
manipulate one or more factors (the independent variables) to
observe their effect on behavior (the dependent variable). It is
important to give both independent and dependent variables
precise operational definitions that specify how to manipulate the independent variable (in our case, empirical expectations) and how to measure the dependent variable (conforming
behavior).
In the next chapter I will discuss at length how to measure
norms, and in particular, how to manipulate expectations to
assess causality. For example, one way to influence empirical expectations is to tell one group of participants in an experiment
10.

Many interventions have been based on the belief that economic or
ecological conditions are the most important causal factors, and that
changing them would dramatically improve the situation. Since many
such interventions failed, we must be aware that it is of foremost importance to correctly identify causal factors.
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about the behavior of other participants in a similar past experiment (thereby changing their empirical expectations).
Another group of participants (the control group) instead is
not given any information. If there is a significant difference in
behavior between the two groups, we can be fairly certain that
expectations matter to choice (Bicchieri and Xiao 2009).
Another, less precise way to check for a causal connection
is to ask counterfactual or simply hypothetical questions. If a
behavioral pattern is very common, we may ask those who conform to it what they would do if most people in their reference
network were to behave differently. Would they stick to the behavior? If not, why not?
Empirical expectations must be coupled with a conditional preference for conforming; otherwise they will have
no influence on behavior. Conformity may be driven by .the
desire to imitate or to coordinate with others. But what about
when normative influences play a stronger role? What about
behaviors that are keenly endorsed by a reference network, so
much so that deviation gets punished and compliance praised?
What about situations in which the expectation of approval
and disapproval, the acknowledged presence of sanctions, act
as important motivators? In these cases, we are dealing with
social norms.

SOCIAL NORMS
Consider the following scene. A long line of people is waiting to
buy a ticket for a popular movie. Someone approaches the first
person in line and offers a few dollars to take her place. When
I give this example to my class, students react with outrage.
"If I were in line behind the guy, I would get mad," and "it is
unfair to those who wait patiently" are common reactions. If
the payment is to literally cut in front of the first person, then
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the exchange is imposing a negative externality on everyone
behind her in the queue because they now have to wait one
person longer. She has no right to sell her place. Indeed, paying
for jumping a queue elicits strong disapproval.ll
Alternatively, think what would happen if somebody at
the end of a long line went to the person who was first in line,
and offered him money to switch places. In this case, nobody
would be disadvantaged. Nevertheless, many would find this
exchange objectionable. A common concern is that if we allow
people to jump ahead in queues of all sorts (as opposed to waiting in line), there is a fundamental sense that people are not
treated equally. If economic efficiency is the argument, why
not allow someone to sell her vote as well? While inefficient,
queues embody a standard of fairness in which nobody is more
important than another and anyone can be subject to a wait.
In a world where people can buy their way up, we can imagine
a class of people who are rich and never have to wait, and a
class who always must wait because their time is less valuable
as determined by what they can pay. Many would find such a
world repulsive.
In the first example, people would feel entitled to protest,
even block the transaction. In the second, even if we deeply
dislike the deal, we usually feel we do not have a right to complain. Why this difference? What makes us feel we have a right
to expect certain behaviors but not others? The second transaction is a private one, and though we may dislike it, we recognize that people have a right to conduct their private business
as they like. The first example instead created a public negative externality, as everybody in the line has to wait longer. In
11.

Stanley Milgram (1992) conducted an experiment by sending his students around with the instructions to cut in lines at ticket counters. In
more than half of the cases, people reacted very negatively. Reactions
ranged from dirty looks, to verbal protests, all the way to physical
·
shoves.

30

I

NORMS IN THE WILD

this case there would likely be much social support for openly
and loudly complaining, as opposed to the second case.
When actions create public negative externalities, societies
develop rules to curb these effects. Examples are rules that
enforce cooperation or reciprocation, which are necessary to
support social interactions. Without cooperation and trust, it
becomes exceedingly hard, if not impossible, to sustain social
exchanges. Yet there are other social rules (in addition to prosocial ones) that can elicit collective support. Child marriage
does not seem to curb any particular, public negative externality. In a society where child marriage is the norm, waiting
to marry off one's daughter will only produce negative consequences for the family and the unmarried girl, not the broader
society. Yet witnesses to a contravention in such a society will
feel entitled to blame, gossip about, ostracize, or pity the girl.
The socially imposed ought is present in these practices, even
if it is not borne out of a pro-social necessity.
I believe that the difference between rules that enforce prosociality and other sorts of shared practices stems from their
origins. The latter may have evolved from simpler descriptive
norms that, with time, acquired a special symbolic meaning
(as I discuss further in chapter 3), whereas the former directly
evolved from a collective need to guarantee a measure of social
order. Once they are established, both kinds of rules ultimately
share the same features that identify them as social norms.
Social norms perform a double function. They tell us that
particular behavioral responses are warranted in situations that
are sufficiently similar to each other: you do not cut in a line of
cars waiting at an intersection, and similarly you do not jump
in front of people queuing for a cab or waiting to be served in
a pastry shop. Social norms also express social approval or disapproval of such behaviors-they tell us how we ought to act.
Social norms are often called injunctive norms: what we collectively believe ought to be done, what is socially approved or
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disapproved of (Rivis and Sheeran 2003). As in the case of descriptive norms, there are ambiguities in this definition, which
may confound shared moral norms with social norms. For example, the moral codes a society or group shares prescribe and/
or proscribe specific behaviors, entail evaluations and judgments, and signal the mutual expectation that we ought to abide
by them. Though some may argue that there really is no difference between social and moral norms, others would object.
My objective here is not to examine the nature of morality. All I want to call attention to is that there is an element of
(social) unconditionality to what we take to be moral rules that
is not present in social norms, in the sense that one's personal
moral convictions are the primary motivator of one's actions,
and such convictions overwhelm any social considerations.
I am agnostic as to the existence of moral norms above and
beyond the reasons people have to follow them. What I want to
say is that-when we obey what we take to be a "moral" rulewe do not condition our choice on the behaviors and beliefs of
other people, at least in principle. So fairness may be a social
norm for some, but a deeply held moral norm for others. There
is nothing about fairness that makes it moral, apart from one's
view that it is a value that one should pursue as best as one can,
even if one witnesses unfair behavior all the time.
From a purely descriptive standpoint, what we call "morality" is a code of conduct that guides behavior. Moral codes regulate the behaviors that a society considers to be most important,
including behaviors that directly or indirectly affect others: rules
against killing, causing pain, and deceiving are all examples
of rules that prohibit causing direct or indirect harmP Moral
codes, however, differ among cultures, as they may also include
rules of purity, honor, or loyalty that could conflict with what we
12. These rules are often subject to exceptions. We might believe that we
must not harm our friends, but it is acceptable to harm our foes.
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take to be "do no harm" injunctions. Honor killing may be seen,
by those that stand by it, as a moral duty. In this case, values of
honor and purity supersede rules against killing. In fact, some
cultures believe that the actions of a "stray woman" bring shame
to her entire family, and this shame must be washed away with
her blood (Feldner 2000). What matters here is that ~very society
tends to "moralize" certain behaviors. This process of moralization happens at an individual level too, but is not uniform in its
spread. When we say that a norm has been internalized, we often
refer to the development of moral beliefs that correspond to societal standards. These beliefs become an independent motivation
to conform, as deviations are often accompanied by guilt.
A norm that dictates female genital cutting (FGC) may
embed important ideals of purity and honor, among others,
and be part of the moral code of a group or society. For some
individuals, this rule may be so important that it becomes (socially) unconditional. These individuals do not need to take
into consideration the behavior of their peers when deciding
whether to follow the rule. For other individuals, the choice to
abide by the rule may be conditional on their social expectations. This is why I do not want to talk of moral rules in general, as if they had a status independent of the reasons of the
individuals who follow them. Honor killing may be a social
norm for some, a moral norm for others. All of that said, I can
think of situations in which an individual who has moralized a
rule may fail to follow it (and not because of weakness of will).
Also moral rules can be conditional, but not in the same sense
social norms are. Some moral rules are more important than
others and take precedence in cases of conflict, and in some
situations it is acceptable to abandon or adapt some rules. In a
state of anarchy, one may conclude that harming and deceiving
is the only way to survive, but one may do so with great anguish
and guilt and still endorse (if not follow) general rules against
harming and deceiving (Bicchieri 2006).
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I mention here the strong emotion of guilt because it is
often associated, as a moral emotion, with our commitment
and conformity to what we take to be moral rules. Yet, as I have
noted elsewhere (Bicchieri 2010), emotions are not a necessary
hallmark of morality. One may feel guilty at openly choosing
an unfair division of money, keeping more for oneself, but conveniently give nothing to an unaware party, provided it is plain
that one's unfair choice is hidden (Dana, Weber, and Kuang
2007). Would we be willing to say that fairness matters when
one is "watched," but that it loses its appeal when one can cheat
in secret? It seems that a better way to distinguish, as far as we
want to make such a distinction, between the moral and the
social valence of the rule is to think of the ways in which we
can justify its transgression. If I am willing to defend my unfair
decision by pointing out that "others are unfair too," or that "I
am not really expected to act fairly on this occasion," or even
that "the other party will believe his misfortune was just bad
luck," it seems clear that my choice was conditional on having
certain social expectations. Fairness, in these examples, is not
a moral norm to be followed no matter what.
The important point to be made is that we have (in principle) reasons for upholding what we take to be moral norms
that go beyond the fact that we perceive them to be generally
upheld by a reference network that may reproach deviance. Our
commitment to these moral norms is independent of what we
.expect others to believe, do, or approve/disapprove of. Social
norms instead are always (socially) conditional, in the sense
that our preference for obeying them depends upon our expectations of collective compliance. This does not mean that we
may not find good reasons to support some of those norms.
There are many social norms that we may find socially beneficial, like rules of fairness or reciprocity, but I maintain that
most people follow them because they know that they are generally followed and because they expect most individuals in
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their reference network to keep following them. They also have
reason to think most individuals in their reference network believe that they ought to be fair and to reciprocate in the appropriate conditions. In the absence of these social expectations,
one may not reciprocate any longer, despite still believing that,
in a well-functioning society, reciprocity should be the rule.
Like descriptive norms, social norms rely upon empirical
expectations, that is, the belief that others in our reference network follow the norm. However, with social norms, the normative influence is strong and plays a crucial role in driving
compliance. It matters to us that most people in our reference
network believe we ought to conform to a certain behavioral
pattern. This point must be emphasized. First, let me point out
that people may think one ought to behave in a specific way
for many different reasons. Parents who marry off their young
daughters believe they are protecting them while simultaneously affording a good husband at a reasonable dowry price.
Many Islamic countries require women to cover their bodies
and faces, for reasons of modesty and family honor. Southern
whites thought blacks should take menial jobs, to stress their
alleged cultural and economic inferiority and ultimately to support a system that favored whites. A gang requires its members
to wear particular clothes and colors to signal their group identity and show pride in belonging to that group. We think that
trust should be reciprocated, because otherwise we would end
up in a society in which very few transactions would occur. For
every social norm we may think of, we will find some reason why
followers think it should be upheld. When a norm is in place,
we may or may not embrace what we believe are the reasons
why the norm exists. In other words, we may be more or less
sensitive or sympathetic to the norm's contentY Yet the social
13. I shall extensively discuss the role played by norm sensitivity in
chapter 5, when I discuss norm change.
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pressure to conform, expressed in the social expectation that
one ought to conform, is a powerful motivator. I thus define a
social norm as follows (Bicchieri 2006): 14
A social norm is a rule of behavior such that individuals prefer to
conform to it on condition that they believe that (a) most people in
their reference network conform to it (empirical expectation), and
(b) that most people in their reference network believe they ought
to conform to it (normative expectation).

If others believe one ought to conform, the reaction to nonconformity may range from slight displeasure to active or even
extreme punishment. 15 It should be clear that the ought is not
prudential, because disregarding a prudential ought would not
normally elicit a negative sanction. My friends may think that I
ought to diet because being obese threatens my health in many
ways. However, none of them would dream of punishing me
because of my bad eating habits; they might tell me that I ought
to stop, but this would be said out of concern for my wellbeing
rather than wanting to put me "back in line."
14.

I do not use "behavioral pattern" but instead talk of behavioral rules,
for the reason that often norms proscribe behaviors, so we do not typically observe the behavior proscribed by the rule. It is also the case that
a norm may exist but not be followed at a given time if the potential
followers' expectations are not met (Bicchieri 2006, 11).
15. It is important to clarify that this imposed ought is normative in a
strong sense, and not necessarily prudential. Other models, such as
the theory of planned behavior (and its predecessor, the reasoned
action approach; see Ajzen, Albarracin, and Hornik 2007; Fishbein
and Ajzen 2011), do not make this distinction, and failing to do so
can be problematic. The theory of planned behavior relies on the
measurement of behavior-specific attitudes, "subjective norms," and
perceived behavioral control to collectively predict behavioral intentions. The subjective norms in the model refer to individuals' expectations of the degree to which "important others" would approve or
disapprove of their performing a given behavior (Ajzen 1991, 195).
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The extent of the social reaction to a norm transgression
varies, depending on how important or central to social life a
norm is, how entrenched it is, and what sort of real or perceived
harm disobedience creates. It is also important to acknowledge
that many norms admit of variations in behavior and that the
acceptable range of behaviors may be substantial, thus increasing uncertainty as to the scope of deviations and, consequently,
the appropriate severity of sanctions.
It is often the case that norms are not "all or nothing" affairs. Fair divisions, for example, may include a 60-40 percent
share as acceptable. Norms of decorum may tolerate slight
variations in unkemptness (though up to a point). This quality
of degrees of acceptability for a norm is well-addressed in the
Return Potential Model (Jackson 1965). The Return Potential
Model is a method of visualizing acceptable behavior as constrained by norms: on a Y-axis one would plot the amount of
approval one could garner by engaging in an action, and on an
X-axis one would plot the intensity or amount of a behavior
being engaged in (see the example reproduced in Figure 1.1).
Despite having some predictive efficacy, the model's normative component falls short: First, the model always includes a normative predictor, regardless of whether or not the behavior being predicted is
normative in nature. Second, the model does not take descriptive
norms into account (a limitation acknowledged by one of the theory's
founders; see Fishbein 2007). Finally, as mentioned earlier, the model
does not appear to differentiate between second-order prudential
expectations and second-order expectations of a stronger normative
nature (Ajzen 1991). In other words, the model's normative measurements are too broad: when taking the approach of the theory of
planned behavior, it will be impossible to determine whether a respondent believes that her peers believe that engaging in a particular
behavior is wrong because it is unwise (i.e., wrong on a prudential
level) or that it is wrong because it violates some shared rule (e.g.,
fairness). What I call normative expectations, rather than prudential
ones, exert a greater influence on a decision maker when choosing
whether to conform to a social norm .
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For example, an individual with ten dollars in his pocket who
is deciding how much money to give to a beggar might think
that his friends (his reference network) will think he is selfish if
he gives fewer than four dollars, but they will think that a gift of
more than seven dollars is just foolish. Here, the individual assumes that there is a happy medium of donating between four
and seven dollars that will garner approval from his friends.
In the plot one can identify a "point of maximum return," at
which an individual will get the maximum possible approval out
of an action. In the above graph, this point would be at 6 (or six
dollars in the aforementioned example). The Return Potential
Model assumes that norm-relevant actions can always either
improve or damage one's reputation, which might not necessarily be the case (e.g., refusing to defecate in the open when in a
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1.1 The Return Potential Model (reproduced from Jackson 1965).
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Western society would not be likely to improve one's reputation,
but engaging in it would certainly damage one's reputation).
Additionally, there is also a range of behaviors that are seen as
acceptable: in the earlier example, a gift of between four and seven
dollars was perceived to be acceptable. In Bangladesh, a father
might think that marrying off his daughter below the age of seven
is too young (she is just a child!) but marrying her off after the age
of fifteen is too old (people might think she is having premarital
sex if she gets any older). Similarly, each behavior can garner a
range of approval or disapproval. That is, the height of the Y-axis
demonstrates the intensity of positive and negative sanctions that
norm-adherence or norm-violations incur. The Return Potential
Model can also reveal how much agreement (i.e., crystallization)
there is about a norm (though this is not shown in Figure 1.1):
there might be disagreement about how important the norm is
or about where the range of acceptable behaviors lies. The more
disagreement there is on the importance of a norm or on what is
considered "acceptable," the more disagreement there will be on
what kind of sanctions are appropriate. The more people disagree
on what sanctions are appropriate, the more uncertainty there
will be about the sanctions' magnitudes and likelihoods.
As I shall discuss in chapter 5, the combination of punishment (mild, serious, or absent) and a person's sensitivity to the
norm will determine individual compliance. Someone who is
indifferent to or even disagrees with the norm's content will
avoid conformity if no sanction is present, whereas someone
who supports the norm will tend to conform even if no punishment looms. This individual will usually recognize that the
request to conform is legitimate, and respond positively.
Normative expectations may also be accompanied by positive sanctions, such as liking, appreciation, trust, and respect.
Again, the existence of strong positive rewards may move the
indifferent and the contrarian to comply, but it will just reinforce the supporter's conviction. This is why norms that are (or
are believed to be) onerous to follow are usually accompanied
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by strong negative and positive sanctions: in a society in which
cooperation or reciprocation with strangers is perceived to be
difficult to obtain, an honest cooperator is praised, and a nonreciprocator will acquire a bad reputation. A culture that holds
ideals of family respectability and honor, along with the beliefs
that women are men's property, are weak, and are easily seduced, will impose strict rules of conduct on women and punish
transgressions harshly. Honor killing is an extreme measure,
but the reward is high status and social respect. Sometimes
even norms that are not particularly onerous to follow, like
a gang's dress code or other outward signs of belonging, are
supported by significant sanctions, in that disregarding them
defies the group's identity and signals disrespect. In the TV
show Sons of Anarchy, a man who belongs to a motorcycle club
is a "badass." Yet, "You know you're a badass when you'll strap
down an ex-member and set his back on fire to remove his club
tattoo." 16 Small, close-knit groups are particularly defensive
about the norms that identify them, and are ready to punish
deviators who threaten the very identity of the group.
Let me point out again that the cost of deviating from a
descriptive norm, ~specially a convention, is very different
from the cost of deviating from a social norm. Deviating from
a convention, such as a linguistic one, is inherently costly to
the deviating party. Once a convention is established, everyone does better by following it, especially when it is expected
that everyone else adheres to it. Norms are not self-enforcing in
the sense that conventions are. With a norm, there is often the
temptation to transgress it-this is precisely why norms must
be socially enforced. Without these systems of sanctions, the
norm could easily fall apart.
16.

In the show, the person had been required to remove his tattoo, and
since he did not, they burned it off of him so no one would mistake him
for a member in good standing. http://www.sidereel.com/posts/36137news- missing-sons-of-anarchy-top-1 0-badass-moments-featured.
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Here, my aim is not to draw a taxonomy of norms and accompanying sanctions, but rather to stress the relation of conditional preferences to empirical and normative expectations.
I have argued that conformity to a social norm can be completely
independent of attributing value to the norm one obeys. We may
be induced to obey norms we dislike, or reject behaviors that we
find perfectly appropriate. Often, however, especially with norms
that are well established, norm followers tend to value what the
norm stands for. An external observer may be induced to think
that, since people have a positive attitude toward a norm, they
may obey it regardless of what others around them do. Social
expectations do not seem important anymore!
In fact, we may be tempted to explain why a given behavior
persists by referring to the observation that most individuals in
the network where it is commonly practiced share the conviction
that it is good and valuable. We do not seem to be facing conditional preferences here: individuals behave in a similar way
because they all think such behavior carries some advantage.
Is this a correct conclusion? Recall what I said about causality. It involves counterfactual dependence: all other things being
equal, if an individual did not have a positive belief toward x,
she would not do x. What seems required is changing the positive belief alone. Information interventions failed at changing
some negative practices, such as new mothers' refusal to breastfeed immediately after giving birth, because they missed the
fact that people had social expectations and conditional preferences based on them. Information was introduced with the intention of changing factual and personal normative beliefs about
the importance of immediate and continuous breastfeeding, the
damages of giving newborns water (often contaminated), and the
connection between infant mortality and traditional practices.
Such interventions were not accompanied by the understanding
that the practice was supported by widely held social expectations,
both empirical and normative. Even if we were to succeed at convincing a young mother of the benefits of immediate breastfeeding,
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would she dare incur the wrath of her mother-in-law, the scorn of
other women, and the accusation that she was risking the life of
her child? This problem is particularly acute in cases of pluralistic
ignorance (a concept that I will explore later on).
I realize that it might be a bit daunting to keep track of the
various factors that determine the nature of a collective behavior.
Now that I have clarified the features of each collective practice
(in terms of preferences and social expectations), I have included
a visual summary of the diagnostic process of identifying a
social norm and differentiating it from other collective behaviors
in Figure 1.2. I will explore in the following chapter how we can
reach a diagnostic conclusion through measurement.

Observe a collective
pattern of behavior

People prefer to
follow It Irrespective
of what others do

People prefer to
follow it if they have
Social Expectations

J
Collective Custom,
shared Moral Rule or
Legal Injunction

Empirical Expectations
suffice to motivate
action

Empirical and
Normative
Expectations are
needed to motivate
action

I
Descriptive Norm

Social Norm

FIGURE 1.2 Diagnostic process of identifying collective behaviors.
Source: C. Bicchieri, Social Norms, Social Change. Penn-UNICEF Lecture,
July 2012.
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BELIEF TRAPS: PLURALISTIC
IGNORANCE
Consider the case of a social norm N present in a network G.
We know the following:
1.

2.

All members of G believe that all other members of G
followN.
All members of G believe that all other members of G
believe one ought to follow N.

However, it is not true that all members of G believe one ought
to follow N. In fact, the majority of individuals dislike Nand do
not think one ought to follow it. In a UNICEF study about violence on children, it was stunning to realize that caregivers who
report a negative judgment on punishment still punish in large
numbers (country median: 50 percent)Y One possible explanation for this disparity is that these caregivers observe corporal
punishment, or corporal punishment's consequences, such as
bruises, and have no reason to believe that those who conform
to the norm dislike it as much as they do. They dare not speak
out or openly transgress, for fear of being regarded as weak or
uncaring parents. In this way a norm nobody actually likes
will survive, and if deviations occur, they will be kept secret.
This is an example of pluralistic ignorance, a cognitive state in
which each member of a group believes her personal normative beliefs and preferences are different from those of similarly
situated others, even if public behavior is identical (Miller and
McFarland 1987). The following set of conditions is a fertile
ground for pluralistic ignorance (Bicchieri 2006, ch. 5; 2014):
a)

17.

Individuals engage in social comparison with their
reference network. We constantly observe what others

www.childinfo.org./discipline.htrnl.
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do, and from these observations we get clues about appropriate behavior, others' preferences, beliefs, and so
forth. In the case of norms, we are influenced by the
behavior of other network members, but we do not
know the true distribution of their beliefs and preferences, which we try to infer from observing their
behavior.
b) Others' behavior is observable. If not, then the consequences of such behavior are observable. 18
c) No transparent communication is possible. Because of
shared values, religious reasons, or simply the fear of
being shunned or ridiculed as a deviant or just different, we do not express views that we think will put us
at a disadvantage.
d) We assume that, unlike us, others' behavior is consistent with their preferences and beliefs. There are several
possible reasons why this might occur. Fear of embarrassment or the desire to fit in are not easy to observe
in others, so we may come to believe that we experience
these emotions more strongly than others do. Another
possible cause of the self/other discrepancy is the fundamental attribution error (Ross 1977): we tend to overestimate the extent to which others act on private motives (beliefs, preferences), while we instead attribute
our own behavior to external factors (social pressure in
this case).
e) We infer that all but us endorse the observed norm. We
discount personal evidence in favor of what we observe
and take it at face value.

18.

For example, compliance with norms that regulate sexual behavior or
other unobservable behaviors can be assessed by observing the presence or absence of the consequences of such behaviors. In the case of
norms that prohibit pre-marital sex, teen pregnancies would be a sign
that the norm has been flouted.
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All end up conforming to the public norm, oblivious to the
possibility that they are participants in a group dynamic
in which all pretend to support the norm, while in fact all
dislike it.
In a state of pluralistic ignorance, individuals are caught
in a belief trap and will keep following a norm that they deeply
dislike. How long can this last? One may suspect that a norm
that is so disliked would not be stable, since even small shocks
to the system of beliefs that support it would lead to its demise.
Once the frequency of true beliefs is conveyed to the relevant
population, a change would occur. Such change may be feasible
with a descriptive norm, but it is much more difficult to obtain
in the case of a social norm.
Berkowitz and Perkins (1987; see also Berkowitz 2005)
have taken advantage of the effectiveness of beliefs shocks,
public revelations of pluralistic ignorance, when attempting
to change maladaptive descriptive norms that are maintained
by pluralistic ignorance, particularly alcohol consumption on
college campuses. Their approach is designed to stop people
from engaging in a collective practice by informing them
that participation rates (typically drinking rates) are lower
than they might appear. Such information serves to update a
target audience's empirical expectations. This approach, when
properly implemented, is effective at combatting descriptive
norms that suffer from pluralistic ignorance (which are supported by inaccurate empirical expectations), but is not effective at changing independent practices, such as customs
(if you inform people that fewer of their peers use umbrellas than they previously thought, why should they care?), or
social norms, which are additionally supported by normative
expectations.
Since a social norm is supported by normative expectations,
it is not sufficient to publically disclose that most individuals

DIAGNOSING NORMS

I

45

dislike the norm and would like to do something different. The
participants must also be sure that its abandonment will not be
followed by negative sanctions. People face a double credibility
problem here: they must believe that the information they receive about others' true beliefs is accurate, and they must also
believe that everyone else is committed to change their ways.
There are many ways to achieve these goals, and there are several examples in the literature of successful changes of negative
norms by means of information campaigns, public declarations,
and common pledges (Bicchieri and Mercier 2014). Any successful change, as I shall argue in the last two chapters, must
change both empirical and normative expectations, their relative order depending on whether a norm is being created or
abandoned.
Whether we are facing pluralistic ignorance is an entirely
empirical question. A few years ago, a friend from UNICEF
presented me with the following data, confessing she was at a
loss as to how to interpret them. 19
She noted that in Sudan, Djibuti, and Burkina Paso
there was a significant discrepancy between the prevalence
of FGC and its support among women who would have been
directly involved in getting their daughters cut. However,
in places like Chad, prevalence and support were very much
in line. 20 At the time, I knew that women were only questioned about their attitudes, not about their expectations,
19.

20.

The data sources in Table 1.3 are UNICEF global databases, based
on DHS, MICS, and other nationally representative surveys. See
more at: http://data.unicef.org/child-protection/fgmc.html#sthash.
jV8FtLDS.dpuf.
It is important to notice that the 49.4 percent of women who supported
the practice in Chad might not overlap with the 44.9 percent who actually engaged in the practice. In this respect, it is important to consider the
strength of a social norm in a population. For example, we would have to
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Table 1.3

FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING PREVALENCE VS.
SUPPORT OF THE PRACTICE AMONG WOMEN 15-49
Support Dataset sources

Area name

Time
period

Prevalence

Somalia
Guinea
Djibouti
Egypt

2006
2005
2006
2008

97.9
95.6
93.1
91.1

64.5
69.2
36.6
54

Sudan
Mali
Ethiopia

2006
2007
2005

89.3
85.2
74.3

23.7
76
31.4

Burkina
Fa so
Mauritania
Chad

2006

72.5

11.1

2007
2004

72.2
44.9

53.4
49.4

Yemen

1997

22.6

41

MICS 2006
DHS 2005
MICS 2006, table CPS.
DHS 2008, table 15.1,
p. 197
SHHS 2006
DHS 2006
DHS 2005,
table 16.13, p. 253
MICS 2006, table CPS.
MICS 2007
DHS 2004, table 11.1,
page 170
DHS 1997

especially normative ones. It was possible that in Sudan
women did not dare express their true preferences and beliefs and kept performing a ritual that was expected of them,
without being aware they were not the lone deviants. It is
also possible that women knew about other women's opinions, but were forced to perform the ritual, or that the practice was so ubiquitous that it had become naturalized and
consider the central tendency (that is, how strong the norm is) in different groups, as well as the norm dispersion (that is, how uniformly groups
conform to the norm). Typically, a social norm is very strong where there
is a clear and high central tendency and very little dispersion.
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people did not even consider alternatives, even if they might
not have had a strong preference for it. To know the reasons
for the discrepancy, we must be able to measure normative
expectations, and check whether perceived and objective
consensus differ. Measuring expectations is precisely what
I recommend doing in the next chapter, when I tackle the
issue of norm measurement.
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CONCLUSION
Many programs designed to curb the incidence of sexual behaviors that spread AIDS, induce people to build and use
latrines, educate girls, or convince families not to marry off
their very young daughters have failed. Program failures have
taught us that causal factors that drive collective behaviors
have to be addressed in order to change descriptive and social
norms, and the first, most important step in a successful intervention is precisely to identify causal relations. I have maintained that experiments are the best way to assess causal relations. However, it may be very difficult to manipulate personal
evaluations in an experiment. 21 What we can do is influence
expectations about what others do or believe should be done
(that is, alter normative and empirical expectations). In other
words, if we were to believe that social expectations play no role
in directing behavior, then altering them experimentally (creating or eliminating them) should not change the behavior of
individuals who have expressed a positive evaluation (through
a survey) of the behavior in question. I will return to this important point in the chapter on measurement. For the time
being, let me remind the reader that the link between personal
normative beliefs and behavior is not necessarily strong (Eagly
and Chaiken 1993). People may say that they approve or disapprove of something, but when we look at their actions we often
see no consistency with their evaluative judgments.
In defining social norms as I did, I have stressed the role
of conditional preferences and social expectations. In other
words, I have relied upon the reasons that make people behave
21.

We may give damning information about a company (it uses slave
labor!) and thus change a subject's personal evaluation of that company, but it would be· much harder to change personal evaluations
about common, valued, and long-established practices.
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as they do. Understanding these reasons is critical to instigating social change, as I shall discuss further in chapter 3. If we
believe social norms have causal efficacy, we must be ready to
show that, were the expectations that support a norm absent,
the norm would no longer be followed. Since the preference for
following a social norm is conditional upon having the right
kind of social expectations, altering expectations should affect
behavior in significant ways.
Again, experiments are the best means to check whether
empirical and normative expectations matter to choice and
under what conditions. Yet there are many situations in which
experiments are difficult or impossible to perform, and we may
have to fall back on surveys and vignettes to assess whether a
norm is present and how and when it influences behavior. In
the following chapter I shall provide tools for measuring norms
and ways to check the causal p~thways that link a social norm
to actions.

